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During the past two decades, physicians have been able to obtain
an increasing amount of genetic information about fetuses before
birth. The diagnostic techniques that physicians use do more than
predict the future health of the developing fetus, however, they trans-
form the culture of motherhood-society's expectations of pregnant
women and women's expectations of themselves. Decisions to un-
dergo genetic testing-and control or lack of control over dissemina-
tion of the results of such testing-affect a woman's self-image, her
personal relationships, and how she is regarded by institutions such as
insurers and employers. These impacts should be taken into consider-
ation by health care providers and policynakers as they develop prac-
tices and policies for the use of prenatal testing.' Based on analyses of
the potential impacts of prenatal testing, this article makes policy rec-
ommendations regarding the regulation of a new form of prenatal
testing, fetal cell sorting (FCS).
* Lori B. Andrews is a Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar
at the Chicago-Kent College of Law and a Research Fellow at the American Bar Founda-
tion. This work was supported by a grant from the National Center for Human Genome
Research, National Institutes of Health, R01-HGO1277-01. I would like to thank Lisa
Wegrzyn, Nanette Elster, and Greg Kelson for their invaluable help in the preparation of
this article, and Anita Bernstein and Katherine Baker for their comments. I also appreci-
ate the opportunity given to me by Laura Rothstein when she was program chair of the
Women in Legal Education Section of the American Association of Law Schools to partici-
pate in a panel on social control of women during pregnancy.
1. This type of policy analysis-grounded in empirical data about the actual impact
on individuals-is rarely undertaken in law journals. However, there is a growing consen-
sus that such an analysis is the most appropriate way to develop a policy response to the
new reproductive technologies. See, for example, the articles of Dorothy Roberts and
Michael Shapiro in this symposium. Other observers of genetic policy development have
come to similar conclusions. Benjamin Wilfond and Kathleen Nolan, for example, have
criticized what they label as the "extemporaneous" manner in which genetics policy has
been made in the United States. They argue in favor of using an "evidentiary" approach
incorporating evaluation of impacts and attention to underlying norms. Benjamin S.
Wilfond & Kathleen Nolan, National Policy Development for the Clinical Application of
Genetic Diagnostic Technologies, 270 JAMA 2948, 2949 (1993).
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I. The Nature of Prenatal Diagnosis
A growing number of pregnant women receive genetic informa-
tion about their fetus' well-being through fetal blood sampling, chori-
onic villi sampling, amniocentesis, maternal serum alphafetoprotein
screening and other technologies.2 However, such information is ob-
tained at some risk to the fetus itself. Fetoscopy, in which blood is
sampled from the fetus while it is in utero, is associated with a 3% to
6% risk of fetal death.3 Chorionic villi sampling, in which tissue sur-
rounding the fetus is sampled and analyzed between eight and twelve
weeks of gestation, is associated with a 2% to 3% spontaneous abor-
tion rate.4 Amniocentesis, in which fluid from the amniotic sac is
withdrawn and analyzed, causes spontaneous abortion in approxi-
mately one or two per thousand pregnancies. 5 These procedures en-
tail physical risks to pregnant women as well, particularly risks of
infection.6 Some women choose to run these risks and undergo prena-
tal screening because they intend to terminate a pregnancy if the fetus
is diagnosed as having a serious disorder.
There are currently hundreds of tests that can be performed on
fetal tissue obtained through fetoscopy, chorionic villi sampling and
amniocentesis, 7 such as fetal testing to identify chromosomal disorders
2. In the state of New York alone, 25,000 women per year are screened for fetal
genetic abnormalities. Kimberly Nobles, Birthright or Life Sentence: Controlling the
Threat of Genetic Testing, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2081, 2086 (1992). Michael Malinowski notes
that "[olne reason for our acceptance of extensive prenatal genetic screening is that it is
being introduced to us through the health profession rather than through a social move-
ment." Michael Malinowski, Coming into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of Prenatal
Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1453 (1994).
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN GENE THERAPY BACKGROUND
PAPER 64 (1984).
4. Id. at 65. Moreover, there have been some reports of limb defects resulting from
chorionic villi sampling undertaken prior to the tenth week of pregnancy. Barbara K. Bur-
ton, Spectrum of Limb Disruption Defects Associated with Chorionic Villus Sampling, 91
PEDIATRICS, 989, 989-90 (1993).
5. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN GENE THERAPY BACKGROUND
PAPER 64 (1984). See also Mitchell S. Golbus et al., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis in 3000
Amniocenteses, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 162 (1979).
6. See Mark Deutchman & Ellen L. Sakornbut, Diagnostic Ultrasound in Labor and
Delivery, 51 AM. FAM. PrvSICIAN 145, 151 (1995).
7. Fetuses can be tested for single-gene disorders, caused by a defect in a particular
gene pair. These disorders are of two types-dominant or recessive. There are currently
nearly 1500 diseases that are thought to be dominant single-gene disorders. These include
achondroplasia (a type of dwarfism), some forms of chronic glaucoma (which causes blind-
ness), Huntington's disease (which causes degeneration of the nervous system), and
hypercholesterolemia (a high level of cholesterol in the blood that may lead to heart dis-
ease). With a dominant disorder, the parent who carries the gene is also at least somewhat
affected by the disease. The affected parent has one normal gene and one faulty gene in
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such as Down syndrome.8 And often, genetic information about the
fetus provides genetic information about the mother.
Perhaps because the diagnostic techniques of fetoscopy, chorionic
villi sampling and amniocentesis present physical risks, no state has
adopted laws mandating their use. Moreover, the use of diagnostic
techniques is generally limited to women whose fetuses are at greater-
than-average risk of a genetic or chromosomal disorder, such as those
over the age of thirty-five (who are at a greater-than-average risk of
giving birth to a child with Down syndrome) or those who have family
histories of or ethnic group experience with genetic disorders. In
many instances, this means that the women who are offered prenatal
testing have some knowledge of the disorders for which the fetus is
tested. Most women are familiar with Down syndrome. Women who
the specific pair causing the disease, but because the defective gene is dominant, the nor-
mal gene cannot compensate for the problems caused in the faulty gene. Since the child
inherits only one of the two genes in a pair from each parent, there is a 50/50 chance that
the gene that that parent passes on to the child will be a faulty one and that the child, too,
will suffer from the dominant genetic disorder. Sometimes, though, the problem will not
manifest itself at birth but will appear much later in the child's life. The dominant single-
gene disorder Huntington's disease, for example, does not generally appear until the af-
fected person is in his or her late forties.
In the case of a recessive single-gene disorder, the person who has one faulty gene in a
pair is not affected by the disease because the normal gene in the pair makes up for the
faulty gene. That person is known as a carrier. If two carriers have a child together, there
is a one-in-four chance that the child will inherit one faulty gene from each parent and thus
have the recessive single-gene disease. There are about 1100 recessive single-gene disor-
ders, including sickle cell anemia (a blood disorder that primarily affects African-Ameri-
cans), cystic fibrosis (a disorder affecting the muscles and sweat glands), phenylketonuria,
also known as PKU (a deficiency in an essential liver enzyme), galactosemia (an inability
to metabolize milk sugar), thalassemia (a blood disorder that primarily affects people of
Mediterranean ancestry) and Tay-Sachs disease (a disorder of the nervous system that pri-
marily affects Eastern European Jews).
X-linked disorders, another type of genetic difficulty, affect males who inherit the de-
fects from their mothers. In this situation, the defective gene occurs only on the X chromo-
some. Such defects are generally recessive. Since every woman has two X chromosomes,
there is a 50% chance she will pass on her defective X to her children and a 50% chance
she will pass on her healthy X. The daughter of a woman with an X-linked disorder is
generally unaffected. Because she gets an X from her mother and an X from her father,
even if she gets the defective X from her mother, its defects are made up for by the normal
X that her father gives her. Since a son always gets a Y from his father, an X with a
mutation from his mother will not be compensated for, and the son will suffer from the
disease. Over 100 X-linked disorders are known. They include hemophilia (also known as
bleeding disease), Duchenne's muscular dystrophy (involving muscle deterioration) and a
mental retardation in boys known as Fragile X.
8. Down syndrome is caused by additional material of chromosome 21 which results
in various malformations and mental retardation. See Committee on Genetics, American
Academy of Pediatrics, Health Supervision of Children with Down Syndrome, 93 PEDIAT-
RiCS 855, 855 (1994).
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have a family history of a disorder such as cystic fibrosis or sickle cell
anemia may know an affected relative. And within ethnic groups that
have a higher-than-average risk of certain genetic diseases (such as
sickle cell anemia among African-Americans or Tay-Sachs disease
among Ashkenazi Jews), there is often widespread community knowl-
edge about those disorders.
Two developments, though, are changing the nature of prenatal
diagnosis. The first is the advent of multiplex testing, in which numer-
ous genetic tests can be performed on a single tissue sample. 9 As a
result, some women will be offered prenatal testing for a wide range
of disorders about which they have little knowledge, and the descrip-
tion of the disorder given by health care providers may have undue
influence on whether these women choose to undergo testing and
abort based on the results. The range of tests offered is growing con-
tinually, due in large measure to concerted efforts by the Human Gen-
ome Project, a $3 billion federally funded endeavor to map and
sequence the complete set of genes in the human body. Prenatal test-
ing is now possible not just for serious, life-threatening disorders10 but
also for disorders that are treatable after birth, for disorders that do
not manifest until later in life, such as breast cancer, and even for
conditions not thought to be medical problems, such as
homosexuality.
At the same time, a developing technology offers more women
the option of prenatal testing. This technology, fetal cell sorting, pro-
vides fetal information without creating a physical risk to the fetus or
the pregnant woman. A "simple" blood test is performed on the wo-
man. In the laboratory, technicians use complex procedures to cap-
ture minute quantities of fetal blood cells circulating in the woman's
blood.'1 Prenatal diagnosis is undertaken on those cells, to determine,
9. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 177 (Lori B.
Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
10. An example of a disorder that most people consider to be serious is Tay-Sachs
disease, which generally causes a painful death by age three.
11. For a description of the technology, see Sherman Elias et al., First Trimester Pre-
natal Diagnosis of Trisomy 21 in Fetal Cells from Maternal Blood, 340 LANCET 1033, 1033
(1992); see also Jane Chueh & Mitchell S. Golbus, Prenatal Diagnosis Using Fetal Cells
from the Maternal Circulation, 159 W.J. MED. 308, 311 (1993); Richard Saltus, Noninvasive
Way is Cited to Deter Down Syndrome in Fetuses, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1992, at 8.
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for example, whether the fetus has Down syndrome, cystic fibrosis, 12
Tay-Sachs disease,13 or other disorders.
Researchers developing fetal cell sorting have pointed out that it
could be used to screen large populations of women. One group of
researchers has noted that,
because the ... procedure requires sampling of maternal blood
rather than amniotic fluid, it could make widespread screening in
younger women feasible.... Widespread screening is desirable be-
cause the relatively large number of pregnancies in women below 35
years old means that they bear the majority of children with chro-
mosomal abnormalities despite the relatively low risk of such abnor-
malities in pregnancies in this age group.' 4
The advent of fetal cell sorting raises an important policy issue
regarding women's control of prenatal testing. Because the procedure
does not create a physical risk to the fetus or the woman, there may be
a trend toward undertaking such testing without the woman's consent.
Blood is routinely drawn during pregnancy for a variety of legitimate
purposes, and it would be simple to subject that blood to genetic test-
ing without the woman's knowledge. Already, some obstetricians test
pregnant African-American women for the sickle cell anemia gene
without informing them in advance or asking for their consent. Only
when results indicate that a particular woman is a sickle cell anemia
carrier is she informed. 15 The health care providers believe that the
woman will want this information; they expect that a woman who
finds out that she is a carrier will have her mate tested and, if he is a
carrier as well, will have the fetus tested to determine if it has inher-
12. Cystic fibrosis is "[t]he most common potentially fatal genetic disease" among
Caucasians; it is "caused by a disorder of exocrine glands. Individuals with cystic fibrosis
have a variety of physical abnormalities, [the] most serious among them [being] chronic
obstructive lung disease." OFmcE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, HEALTHY CHrLDREN:
INvErSTING N THE FUTURE 263 (1988).
13. Tay-Sachs disease is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder caused by a genetic muta-
tion. It is very common among Ashkenazi Jews. See, e.g., Eleanor C. Landel et al., Fre-
quency of the Tay-Sachs Disease Splice and Insertion Mutations in the UK Ashkenazi Jewish
Population, 28 J. MED. GENE cS 177, 177 (1991).
14. Leonard A. Herzenberg et al., Fetal Cells in the Blood of Pregnant Women: Detec-
tion and Enrichment by Fluorescence-Activated Cell Sorting, 76 Pnoc. NAT'L AcAD. Scr.
U.S. 1453, 1455 (1979).
15. For an example of a research protocol in which sickle cell anemia screening was
undertaken without informed consent, see Peter T. Rowley et al., Do Pregnant Women
Benefit from Hemoglobinopathy Carrier Detection? 565 ANNAis N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 152, 153
(1989).
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ited a gene from both parents and thus will develop sickle cell
anemia. 16
Because fetal cell sorting presents fewer physical risks than ex-
isting prenatal diagnostic techniques, there is also a possibility that
policymakers may mandate that women undergo the procedure. The
ostensible purpose would be for couples to receive information that
would help guide their reproductive decisions. However, since the ge-
netic disorders being screened for are generally untreatable,17 the only
reproductive option in most situations would be to abort an affected
fetus. Thus, the underlying goal of such an approach would be to en-
courage the termination of affected fetuses, in order to save society
the expense of caring for such children.
Currently, genetic testing of adults is not mandated by law in any
circumstance. However, in five states, laws require that blood samples
be taken from newborns and tested for genetic disorders such as
phenylketonuria and congenital hypothyroidism.18 In forty other
states, parents ostensibly have the right to refuse newborn screening, 19
but since parents in most of those states are not told that they have
such a right, testing is de facto mandatory there, too. The initial pur-
pose of such laws was to detect certain diseases early enough for the
infant to be treated in a timely fashion. For example, treatment of
phenylketonuria shortly after birth can prevent mental retardation.
However, some states have expanded their mandatory newborn
screening programs so that more and more genetic diseases are evalu-
ated in the single blood sample. In Pennsylvania,20 for example, in-
fants are tested for Duchenne muscular dystrophy,21 even though
early detection will have no influence on the clinical course of the
disease. Rather, the information generated is purportedly for the par-
ents' benefit. If the infant has the disorder, the mother is a carrier;
there is a 50% risk that any son she conceives will be affected. The
16. Physicians may be overestimating couples' interest in fetal testing. See id. In one
study, physicians describe this involuntary testing as beneficial, even though in that study
none of the couples who learned that the woman was carrying a fetus with sickle cell ane-
mia took action on that information and underwent an abortion. Il
17. For the disorders that are treatable after birth, such as phenylketonuria, there is
no real advantage to screening during pregnancy as opposed to after birth.
18. LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 238 (1987).
19. Id.
20. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 9, at 261.
21. Duchenne muscular dystrophy is a "[p]rogressive deterioration of muscles begin-
ning in infancy and leading to death in [the] second or third decade. Inheritance is X-
linked recessive." Committee on Genetics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Newborn
Screening Fact Sheet, 83 PEDIATRICS 449, 457 (1989).
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logic in screening an infant for Duchenne muscular dystrophy is that it
will provide information that helps parents make future reproductive
plans. Similar logic may be used to attempt to justify mandatory pre-
natal screening using fetal cell sorting.
A. Why a Simple Blood Test Isn't So Simple
The current practices surrounding prenatal screening seem to rely
on an assumption that providing genetic information to women during
pregnancy is an unquestionable benefit. This may lend support to the
policy of state-mandated testing of pregnant women, particularly
when the intervention entails minimal physical risk.22 This article ar-
gues against mandatory fetal cell sorting, however, in large measure
because of the psychological, social, and financial risks it entails.
The information generated by genetic testing is powerful infor-
mation. Genetic information can affect women's reproductive behav-
ior-such as their willingness to conceive a child,23 continue a
pregnancy,-4 or use alternative reproduction technologies (such as
gamete or embryo donation) or adoption to become a parent.2-5 It can
change the way women experience pregnancy and motherhood.26 The
existence of prenatal diagnostic technologies may also change ideas
about what type of children are "normal" and worthy of a mother's
unconditional love.2 7
Much evidence indicates that receipt of genetic information can
cause significant psychological, social, and financial risks to women.
22. As noted at pages 999 to 1002 infra, in various policy realms, interventions involv-
ing minimal physical risk have been viewed as permissible. For example, state-ordered
blood testing in some Fourth Amendment contexts has been seen as permissible due to the
fact that it entailed "minor intrusion." See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772
(1966). Similarly, courts that have upheld a woman's right to refuse a forced Cesarean
section have nonetheless indicated in dicta that they might consider imposing less intrusive
interventions on a woman against her will. See, e.g., Baby Boy Doe v. Doe, 632 N.E.2d
326, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
23. Nancy Wexler, Clairvoyance and Caution: Repercussions from the Human Gen-
ome Project, in THm CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL IssuEs IN Tim HuMAN
GENOME PRomcr 211, 227 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
24. Golbus et al., supra note 5, at 157.
25. Michael K. McCormack et al., Attitudes Regarding Utilization of Artificial Insemi-
nation by Donor in Huntington Disease, 14 AM. J. MED. GENECS 5, 6 (1983).
26. Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Then and Now, 8 F-rAL DIAG-
NOSIS & TnrmApy 60, 60-61 (Supp. 1, 1993); Tjeerd Tyimstra, Prenatal Diagnosis, Prenatal
Screening, and the Rise of the Tentative Pregnancy, 7 INTL J. TECH. AssEssMENT 509, 514-
15 (1991).
27. A recent poll suggested that 12% of Americans would consider aborting a fetus
that is predisposed to obesity. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among
Parents of Children with Cystic Fibrosis, 81(8) AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 992, 994 (1991).
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Social scientific studies show that learning genetic information about
oneself or one's fetus can have a negative impact on one's self-con-
cept, can significantly change the way one experiences pregnancy, can
change one's personal relationships and, if the information is shared
with others, can lead to stigmatization and discrimination. These risks
provide a policy rationale for recognizing a woman's right to refuse
fetal cell sorting.
B. Overall Impact of Prenatal Screening
Many pregnant women who choose to undergo prenatal screen-
ing feel that it offers them an overall benefit by allowing them to
make an informed choice about their pregnancies. A federal court
has recognized the importance of this choice by indicating that the
constitutional protections of the abortion decision logically "must also
include the right to submit to a procedure designed to give informa-
tion about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to abort."28
The fact that many women undergo prenatal testing and make deci-
sions based on that information, however, does not indicate that the
process is an easy one for women.29 The testing process generally pro-
vokes anxiety, whether or not a woman ultimately receives the com-
forting news that her fetus is not affected with the disorders for which
it has been tested. The news that her fetus is affected with a disorder
has even more profound consequences, since a woman must grapple
with the decision to continue or terminate the pregnancy. Moreover,
abortion of the wanted fetus because of its genetic profile often causes
grief, sorrow and guilt. And, with impacts that last far longer than the
pregnancy, the diagnosis that the fetus has a particular genetic disor-
der often provides the woman with information about her own genetic
status. The woman will face varying degrees of difficulty in incorpo-
rating this information about herself into her self-concept, her per-
sonal relationships and her dealings with social institutions.
C. Impact on Psychological Well-Being and Self-Concept
Learning genetic information about oneself or one's fetus has an
impact on a woman's emotional well-being and self-concept.30 With
28. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
29. Genetic counselors point out that "[n]o matter how glad they are that they termi-
nated the pregnancy or how much they love the health-impaired child they have, they still
will be saddened by the loss of the child or the things the child cannot do." Malinowski,
supra note 2, at 1467.
30. See, e.g., Mack Lipkin, Jr. et al., Genetic Counseling of Asymptomatic Carriers in a
Primary Care Setting, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 115, 119-20 (1986). There are also
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prenatal testing, diagnosis of the fetus generally reveals genetic infor-
mation about the mother or father or both. If the fetus is affected
with a recessive disorder, both the woman and her mate are carriers of
the gene for the disorder.3 1 Although a woman's carrier status will
have no effect on her health, and she may understand that fact, carri-
ers as a whole have more negative feelings about their future health
than do members of the general population.3 2 In addition, the infor-
mation-which she would not have learned if she had not undertaken
genetic testing in conjunction with reproduction-may change her
view of herself. She may feel "defective" somehow. This has hap-
pened to women whose sons are mentally retarded due to the chromo-
somal abnormality of Fragile X.33 Some feel that they have "failed" in
the role for which society most values them-producing healthy
sons.34
Identification as a carrier of a recessive genetic disease generates
anxiety,35 which can have a lasting impact on the individual.36 Women
experience anxiety when they or their spouses are identified as carri-
ers.37 The impact of the test results on the spouse is related to the
speculative philosophical writings about how genetic technologies might change self-con-
cept. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, The Human Genome Project and Human Identity, 29 Hous.
L. REv. 7, 13 (1992).
31. The carriers of a gene for a recessive disorder do not themselves have the disor-
der. See supra note 7.
32. Theresa M. Marteau, Psychological Implications of Genetic Screening, in 28 BIRTH
DEFECrs: OIUGIrAL AirtcLE SERIES 185, 186 (1992) (although Tay-Sachs carriers viewed
their current health status no differently from non-carriers, carriers' perception of future
health and risk of illness was significantly more negative than non-carriers').
33. In that situation, the mother has passed on the mutant gene on the X chromo-
some; the father has passed on a Y chromosome. See supra note 7.
34. LoI B. ANDREws, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEwEST
INFERTiLIY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VrrRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINA-
TION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 79 (1985).
35. Barton Childs et al., Tay-Sachs Screening: Social and Psychological Impact, 28
AM. J. HUM. GENETIcs 550, 550-51 (1976).
36. In a study of cystic fibrosis carrier testing, 27% of carriers remained slightly anx-
ious over test results six months after testing. Eila K. Watson et al., Psychological and
Social Consequences of Community Carrier Screening Programme for Cystic Fibrosis, 340
LANcET 217,218 (1992). Similarly, in an eight year follow-up of individuals who had been
screened for Tay-Sachs carrier status in high school, 46% recalled that they were worried at
the time of their result. Nineteen percent remained worried eight years later. Susan Zees-
man et al., A Private View of Hetrozygosity: Eight Year Follow-Up Study on Carriers of the
Tay-Sachs Gene Detected by High School Screening in Montreal, 18 AM. J. MED. GENETICS
769, 772 (1984).
37. Anxiety was most often associated with fears of children inheriting the disease,
lack of understanding of the meaning of carrier status, and shock at "having been singled
out." Individuals experiencing the most anxiety were women who were identified as carri-
ers and were pregnant. Childs et al., supra note 35, at 551.
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gender of the spouse. Female partners of carriers more often experi-
ence heightened anxiety along with their husbands, whereas male
partners of carriers less often experience anxiety with their wives.3 8
This data indicates that female partners in couples where one or both
learn their carrier status are more susceptible to heightened levels of
anxiety, regardless of whether they or their partners are found to be
carriers.
If a fetus is diagnosed as having a dominant disorder, for which
the woman herself is at risk, the diagnosis of the fetus with the gene
means that the mother has it as well. This occurs most strikingly in the
case of Huntington's disease, a debilitating neurological disorder that
generally does not begin to affect people until their late forties. Most
people who have a parent with the disorder, and thus are at 50% risk
of having the disorder themselves, decide not to get tested.39 Since
there is no treatment, they see no benefit in learning their status.
Nancy Wexler observes that "if the test [of the fetus for Huntington's
disease] is positive, two massive losses are suffered simultaneously.
The child will most likely be aborted, or else the test would not have
been taken initially. And the parent is immediately diagnosed as an
obligate carrier. '40 If the disorder is a dominant late-onset disorder,
at-risk parents "hear their own death knell with that of their child."'41
The psychological impact of learning that one has the gene for an
untreatable disorder such as Huntington's disease can be devastating.
The suicide rate is four times higher among people with Huntington's
disease than among the general population.42 Even when women are
prepared for bad news as a result of testing, they may still be shocked
by the reality of it. For example, a woman who said before predictive
testing for Huntington's disease that she believed she would be found
to have the faulty gene nonetheless stated after she received the re-
sults, "I feel like someone has died. Part of me has died, the hopeful
38. Id.
39. Less than 15% of at-risk individuals decide to be tested. Maurice Bloch et al.,
Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease: HI. Demographic Characteristics, Life-style Pat-
terns, Attitudes, and Psychosocial Assessments of the First Fifty-One Test Candidates, 32
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 217, 222 (1989) [hereinafter Predictive Testing]. See also David
Craufurd et al., Uptake of Presymptomatic Predictive Testing of Huntington's Disease, 2
LANCET 603, 604 (1989).
40. Nancy S. Wexler, Genetic Jeopardy and the New Clairvoyance, 6 PROGRESS MED.
GENETICS 277, 300 (1985).
41. Id.
42. Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attempted Suicide in Huntington's Disease: Impli-
cations for Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 305, 305 (1986).
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part."43 The woman experienced depression which became increas-
ingly problematic.44
Even when the results of genetic testing reveal that a person does
not have a genetic mutation, the results may cause psychological
harm. Some people experience "survivor's guilt," similar to that of
soldiers whose buddies have died in war, as they wonder why they
have been spared when other family members tragically have inher-
ited the gene.45 Of people who undergo genetic testing for Hunting-
ton's disease and learn that they do not have the gene, 10%
experience severe psychological problems as a result.46 Many people
whose parents have Huntington's disease assume that they have inher-
ited the gene.47 They may live their lives as if they will die of the
disease in their fifties. They may choose not to pursue a particular
career or relationship because they believe that they will get the dis-
ease. Learning that they do not have the gene radically changes their
self-image. 48 One woman said, "If I'm not at risk-Who am ? '4 9
Mandatory fetal cell sorting will force many women to learn ge-
netic information about themselves against their will. The psychologi-
cal risks of mandatory genetic testing may be exacerbated by the
unlikelihood that the state will set aside sufficient funds to provide
counseling for pregnant women and their mates. Various national ad-
visory groups have suggested that patient education and genetic coun-
seling must be an integral part of any genetic testing program.50 Yet
educational counseling is not a routine part of state-mandated new-
43. Maurice Bloch et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington's Disease in Canada: The
Experience of Those Receiving an Increased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED. GENErcs 499, 504
(1992) [hereinafter Huntington's Disease in Canada].
44. Id.
45. Kimberly Quaid et al., Knowledge, Attitude and the Decision to Be Tested for
Huntington's Disease, 36 CLUICAIL GENmcrcs 431, 436-37 (1989); Wexler, supra note 40, at
298.
46. Marlene Huggins et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington's Disease in Canada:
Adverse Effects and Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased Risk, 42 AM. J.
MED. GENETICS 508, 508 (1992).
47. If one of their parents has the disorder, there is a 50% chance that they will inherit
the genetic mutation and get the disorder themselves.
48. In one case, a man whose father had died of Huntington's disease assumed that he
would get the disease as well. Despite being employed, he lived his life on the assumption
that he would die early, therefore failing to plan for his future in financial and interper-
sonal areas. Upon learning that he did not have the disease, he had to re-evaluate his life.
One result of this re-evaluation was that he embezzled from his company in order to over-
come the substantial personal debt that he had accumulated due to his earlier assumptions
about the disease. Huggins et al., supra note 46, at 511-12.
49. Id. at 510.
50. See e.g., CommrrrEE ON AssEssiNG GENETic RisKs, supra note 9, at 14.
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born screening programs. The harms that can result from genetic test-
ing programs that are undertaken without appropriate education and
counseling were well documented in the 1970s, when states mandated
genetic testing of African-Americans for sickle cell carrier status with-
out providing these support services.5 1
D. Effect on Relationships with Family Members
Genetic information also affects one's personal relationships. In-
dividuals may withdraw from family activities and events in order to
avoid having to face family members with whom they do not wish to
share test results.52 In some families, siblings share a bond created by
the fact that they are at risk for having a genetic mutation that runs in
the family. When a woman learns that she has a mutation and her
sibling does not (or vice-versa), this new information can alter the na-
ture of their relationship significantly.
The impact on a sibling relationship can be even more profound
when one sibling is actually affected with the disorder for which an-
other is undergoing prenatal diagnosis. When a woman's brother or
sister is affected with a recessive disorder such as cystic fibrosis, for
example, she may not want to learn her own genetic status, believing
that her risk for having the gene makes her closer to her affected sib-
ling than she will be if she confirms that she does not have the gene.5 3
Moreover, learning that her fetus is affected with a recessive disorder
may strain her relationship with her affected sibling. The affected sib-
ling may perceive the woman's consideration of terminating the preg-
nancy as a rejection of the sibling.
51. See, e.g., PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 62 (1977). See also
Louis J. Elsas II, A Clinical Approach to Legal and Ethical Problems in Human Genetics,
39 EMORY L.J. 811, 827-28 (1990) (when sickle cell screening programs were implemented
without the public's being fully informed and without genetic counseling, one out of every
20 African-Americans was found to be a carrier and many were stigmatized and discrimi-
nated against). See also Leslie Roberts, One Worked; The Other Didn't, 247 SCIENCE 18,
18 (1990).
52. A Canadian group studying predictive testing in Huntington's disease reported a
case study of a woman who received an increased risk result. Although the woman had
informed her father of the results, she did not inform her siblings. Her siblings became
aware of her test results because they recognized her voice on a radio show discussing
Huntington's disease. Her sister confronted her and offered her support and now they
freely discuss Huntington's. Her brother on the other hand is aware of the results, but the
test participant is still unable to discuss the results with him; she avoids family functions
and outings in order to avoid seeing him. Bloch et al., Huntington's Disease in Canada,
supra note 43, at 501.
53. J.H. Fanos & J.P. Johnson, CF Carrier Status: The Importance of Not Knowing,
55(3) AM. J. HUM. GENETICS A292 (#1711) (1994).
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E. Relationships with Spouses and Potential Spouses
Genetic information can also affect relationships with spouses
and potential spouses. In one study, sickle cell anemia testing was
introduced in Orchemenos, Greece.5 4 People who are carriers of the
gene are healthy themselves but, if they procreate with another car-
rier, there is a 25 % chance that any child will have sickle cell anemia.
The health care providers in this study thought that the testing they
offered would decrease the number of affected children by causing
people to make more "rational" reproductive decisions (since, if a car-
rier and a non-carrier have a child together, there is no chance that
the child will be affected with the disorder). The actual result, though,
was that carriers were stigmatized.55 The birth rate of affected chil-
dren did not decrease because, in many instances, only another carrier
would marry a carrier.
A survey of 214 women attending OB/GYN clinics in Ohio found
that 9% of respondents felt that cystic fibrosis carrier status was a
good reason for a couple to avoid marriage.5 6 Men are more likely
than women to say that they would alter marriage plans if they
learned that their fiance was the carrier of a recessive genetic disor-
der. Eight years after participating in Tay-Sachs testing,5 7 95% of fe-
male carriers responded that they would not alter marriage plans
upon discovering that their intended partner was also a carrier.58 In
contrast, only 69% of male carriers responded definitively that they
would not alter marriage plans if their intended spouse was also a car-
rier.59 Another study of Tay-Sachs testing60 found that 25% of carri-
ers and 6% of carriers' spouses felt that knowing their own or their
spouse's carrier status would have affected their marriage decision.61
Sexual relationships, too, may be affected by genetic knowledge.
A study of daughters of breast cancer patients found that satisfaction
with sex within relationships was adversely affected by fears or wor-
54. George Stamatoyannopoulos, Problems of Screening and Counseling in the
Hemoglobinopathies, in BmmT DErnars: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE 268, 272 (Arno G. Motulsky & Widukind Lenz eds., 1974).
55. Seven percent of non-carriers avoided marrying a carrier and some broke off their
engagement when they learned that the potential spouse possessed the sickle cell trait. Id.
at 274.
56. Jeffrey R. Botkin & Sonia Alemagno, Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: A
Pilot Study of the Attitudes of Pregnant Women, 82 AM. J. Pu. HEALTH 723, 725 (1992).
57. Zeesman et al., supra note 36, at 773.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Childs, supra note 35, at 550.
61. Id. at 552.
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ries about breast cancer.62 When compared to matched controls,
daughters of breast cancer patients reported less frequent sexual activ-
ity and less satisfaction with sexual encounters.63 A similar reaction
might occur in women whose awareness of increased risk results from
learning genetic information about their fetuses rather than their
mothers. A study assessing changes in relationships after predictive
testing for Huntington's disease found that individuals who received
an increased risk result indicated a significant decline in satisfaction
with their primary relationship during the two-year follow-up period
after receiving test results.64
F. Impact on Pregnancy
The use of prenatal screening changes pregnant women's rela-
tionships with their fetuses. Instead of bonding with the fetuses early
in the pregnancy, women who undergo prenatal testing delay bonding
until they learn the results of the testing. They often do not tell
friends or family members about the pregnancy. Overall, this results
in what Barbara Katz Rothman has called "the tentative preg-
nancy."'65 Moreover, women are concerned about how their mates
and others will judge the actions they take during pregnancy. A wo-
62. David K. Wellisch et al., Psychological Functioning of Daughters of Breast Cancer
Patients. I. Daughters and Comparison Subjects, 32 PSYCHOSOMATICS 324, 334 (1991),
cited in Caryn Lerman & Marc Schwartz, Adherence and Psychological Adjustment Among
Women at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 28 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 145, 149
(1993).
63. Id. Although this study was conducted on women with an increased risk of breast
cancer, the data reported is useful in determining the effects of genetic testing. Genetic
testing often can determine whether an individual will develop or is at an increased risk of
developing disease, yet testing often falls short of identifying the severity of disease mani-
festation or time of disease onset. This uncertainty is very similar to the uncertainty exper-
ienced by individuals at high risk of disease because of family history. Many of the same
thoughts and fears which affect the daily functioning of daughters of breast cancer patients
may be present in individuals receiving genetic test results that leave uncertainties.
64. This Canadian study of 27 individuals assessed changes in relationships for indi-
viduals participating in predictive testing for Huntington's disease by administering ques-
tionnaires prior to receipt of test results and then again at 7 to 10 days, 6, 12, 18, and 24
months after test results. T. Copley et al., Canadian Collaborative Study for P.T., Signifi-
cant Changes in Social Relations After Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease, 55(3) AM.
J. HUM. GENETICS A291 (#1707) (1994). A U.S. study of individuals participating in pre-
dictive testing for Huntington's disease found similar results. Nineteen couples partici-
pated in testing. Five of the couples received increased risk results. All 5 couples reported
higher levels of marital stress 12 months after receipt of test results than did individuals
with decreased risk results. Kimberly A. Quaid & Melissa K. Wesson, The Effects of Pre-
dictive Testing for Huntington's Disease on Intimate Relationships, 55(3) AM. J. HUM. GE-
NETICS A294 (#1728) (1994).
65. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY 86, 98 (1986).
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man may believe that the father of the fetus will blame her if some-
thing goes wrong with the pregnancy.66
G. Impact of Abortion
A woman who learns that her fetus has a genetic mutation may
feel compelled to abort (or even pressured by her physician to do so),
particularly since, as Adrienne Asch points out, society portrays peo-
ple with disabilities "as being permanently il and in pain."67 At the
same time, a woman may feel that she will be judged too harshly by
friends and relatives for aborting. Women who terminate an affected
pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis often feel guilty.68 In addition,
they are very cautious in deciding whom to tell all the facts surround-
ing the termination of the pregnancy,69 since they are concerned about
the "value judgments" made by others who have never gone through
the same experience. 70
Women who abort affected fetuses express anxiety over whether
they should attempt to conceive again.71 A majority of women fear
that they will have to undergo the same experience over again if they
conceive. 72 In fact, some women indicate that, even if prenatal testing
in future pregnancies indicates that the fetus does not have the tested-
for disorder, they will still be very anxious about the occurrence of
defects that are not detectable by testing.73
H. Impact on the Decision to Carry the Pregnancy to Term
Women may also feel guilty when they carry an affected preg-
nancy to term.74 This is particularly true in the case of mothers who
already have children with a genetic disorder and who give birth to
additional children with the same disorder.75 Society may make wo-
66. Elena A. Gates, The Impact of Prenatal Genetic Testing on Quality of Life in Wo-
men, 8 FETAL DIAGNOsIs & THERAPY 236, 240 (Supp. 1, 1993).
67. Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUcrrVE LAWS
FOR THE 1990s 69, 83 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989).
68. Audrey Heimler, Group Counseling for Couples Who Have Terminated a Preg-
nancy Following Prenatal Diagnosis, 26 BIRTH DEsEcTs: ABSTRAcrs OF SELECTED ARTI-
CLES 161, 167 (1990).
69., Id. at 165.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 166.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Donna G. Olsen, Parental Adjustment to a Child with Genetic Disease" One Par-




men feel guilty for continuing the pregnancy of a fetus with even a
slight disability. This occurred in the case of Bree Walker, a Califor-
nia television anchorwoman affected with ectrodactyly, a mild genetic
condition which fused the bones in her hand. When she decided to
continue a pregnancy of a fetus diagnosed with the same condition, a
radio talk show host and her audience attacked the decision as irre-
sponsible and immoral.76
Health care professionals are more likely to blame women for the
birth of children with genetic conditions if the women refuse prenatal
genetic testing.77 This is particularly troubling since physicians may be
less likely to help women who decline testing because "the outcome,
giving birth to a child with a condition for which prenatal screening is
available, is seen as preventable. ' 78
I. Effect on the Relationship with the Resulting Child
When a woman carries a pregnancy to term, the genetic informa-
tion that she learns about the fetus through mandatory prenatal test-
ing may affect how she treats the resulting child. Some women will
learn that their fetuses will not be affected with a recessive disorder
such as cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs disease, or sickle cell anemia but in-
stead will be a carrier of the disorder. Despite the fact that carrier
status will not affect the child's health, parents may nonetheless view
the child as much at risk medically because of this genetic "abnormal-
ity" 79 and may be overprotective. Parents may also interfere unwar-
rantedly with the child's later choice of a mate or decision to
reproduce. Genetic information can create a feeling of obligation
about the reproductive plans of one's child. One study examining de-
cision-making in families with cystic fibrosis found that 31% of
mothers and 32% of fathers of children with cystic fibrosis believed
that carrier testing was important to provide information pertaining to
risk which would aid carriers in their decision-making concerning mar-
riage and reproduction. 0 Twelve percent of mothers and 18% of fa-
76. See Jean Seligmann & Donna Foote, Whose Baby is it Anyway?, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
28, 1991, at 73; Charlotte Allen, Boys Only: Pennsylvania's Anti-Abortion Law, 206(10)
NEW REPUBLIC 16, 18 (Mar. 9, 1992).
77. Theresa M. Marteau & Harriet Drake, Attribution for Disability: The Influence of
Genetic Screening, 40 Soc. Sci. & MED. 1127, 1129 (1995).
78. Id. at 1130.
79. See Marteau, supra note 32 (describing how carriers view their own future health
negatively).
80. Gerry Evers-Kiebooms, Decision Making in Huntington's Disease and Cystic Fi-
brosis, in 23(2) BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 115, 143 (1987).
[Vol. 47
PRENATAL SCREENING
thers thought that carrier testing was important to avoid marriage of
carrier couples and/or avoid children in couples where both partners
are carriers.81 Fifteen percent of mothers and 14% of fathers indi-
cated that testing was important to avoid the birth of individuals with
cystic fibrosis.82
The impact on the parents' relationship with the resulting child
may be even greater when the fetus has been diagnosed as having a
disorder which shortens his or her life expectancy. The parent may be
less likely to devote emotional care and financial resources to a cur-
rently healthy child who, in ten, twenty, or even fifty years, will fall ill.
A few years ago, a mother entered a Huntington's disease testing fa-
cility with her two young sons. "I'd like you to test my sons for the
HD gene," she said. "I only have enough money to send one to
Harvard." 83 That request and similar requests to test young girls for
the breast cancer gene or to test other young children for carrier sta-
tus for recessive genetic disorders raise enormous questions about
whether parents' genetic knowledge about their children will cause
them to treat those children differently. A variety of studies have sug-
gested that there may be risks in giving parents such information.
Genetic test results will follow a child throughout life,84 poten-
tially "'restricting the future' (and also the present) by shifting family
resources away from a child with a positive diagnosis." 85 Such a child
"can grow up in a world of limited horizons and may be psychologi-
cally harmed even if treatment is subsequently found for the
disorder."86
Because of the potential psychological and financial harm that
genetic testing of children may cause, a growing number of commen-
tators and advisory bodies are recommending that genetic testing not
81. Id. at 144.
82. Id.
83. Wexler, supra note 23, at 233.
84. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents: Who De-
cides?, 272 JAMA 875, 875 (1994).
85. Id. at 878.
86. Id. Similarly, the ASHG/ACMG Statement notes that:
[e]xpectations of others for education, social relationships and/or employment
may be significantly altered when a child is found to carry a gene associated with
a late-onset disease or susceptibility. Such individuals may not be encouraged to
reach their full potential, or they may have difficulty obtaining education or em-
ployment if their risk for early death or disability is revealed.
American Society of Human Genetics & American College of Medical Genetics, Points to
Consider: Ethical Lega4 and Psychosocial Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and
Adolescents, 57 AM. J. HUM. GENErncs 1233, 1236 (1995).
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be undertaken on minor children unless there is an immediate medical
benefit to the child. For example, the Institute of Medicine Commit-
tee on Assessing Genetic Risks has recommended that "in the clinical
setting, children generally be tested only for disorders for which a cur-
ative or preventive treatment exists and should be instituted at that
early stage. Childhood screening is not appropriate for carrier status,
untreatable childhood diseases, and late-onset diseases that cannot be
prevented or forestalled by early treatment. '87 Yet, while testing an
existing child for certain conditions might be considered improper,
physicians and legislators may mandate fetal testing for those same
conditions. For example, Huntington's disease testing is currently not
undertaken on children. However, it might be done on a fetus with
the thought that women would be likely to abort those fetuses af-
flicted with the disease. Since some women will not abort, 88 however,
those women will have information about their children that it has
been recommended that parents not have.
J. Impact on Subsequent Use of Genetic Services and Other Medical
Services
The psychological impact of receiving genetic information
through prenatal testing may be sufficiently troubling that it will lead
some women to refuse future testing in situations in which the testing
might be beneficial. In one cystic fibrosis carrier screening program,
women were sufficiently troubled by the process that they refused
subsequent prenatal testing for maternal serum alphafetoprotein.8 9 In
addition, two couples-who had previously consented to prenatal test-
ing for Huntington's disease during two pregnancies and had termi-
nated the pregnancies as a result-refused prenatal testing during
their third pregnancies and carried to term.90
The fear of undergoing involuntary genetic testing may deter wo-
men from seeking medical care during pregnancy, increasing physical
87. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 9, at 276.
88. For example, some women whose fetuses are at risk for Huntington's disease re-
ject prenatal testing because they believe that a cure will be found before the child devel-
ops the disease (since the age of onset is often in the fifties). Personal Communication
with Nancy Wexler, President, Hereditary Disease Foundation, Sept. 27, 1996.
89. M.E. Mennie et al., Prenatal Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: Psychological Effects
on Carriers and Their Partners, 30(7) J. MED. GENETICS 543, 547 (1993). Similarly, another
couple found prenatal diagnosis for Huntington's disease (and subsequent abortion) in
their first pregnancy so stressful that they refused testing in subsequent pregnancies. M.M.
Burgess, Ethical Issues in Prenatal Testing, 27(2) CLINICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 87, 89 (1994).
90. S. Adam et al., Five Year Study of Prenatal Testing for Huntington's Disease: De-
mand, Attitudes, and Psychological Assessment, 30(7) J. MED. GENETICS 549, 552 (1993).
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risks to them and their fetuses.91 In addition, a mother's stress from
being tested against her will and learning information that she does
not want may harm the fetus in utero.92
K. Impact on Insurability and Employability
In addition to its effects on people's emotional well-being and
self-concept, their relationships with other people, and their use of
medical services, the availability of genetic testing can influence peo-
ple's relationships with third parties such as insurers and employers.
An April 1995 Harris Poll found that 86% of people are concerned
about the prospect of employers and insurers using genetic tests
before deciding whether to hire or insure someone.93 Such a worry is
well-founded. Recently conducted studies reveal contemporary ex-
amples of genetic insurance discrimination. 94 Among people in fami-
lies with a known genetic condition, 31% have been denied health
insurance coverage of some service or treatment because of their ge-
netic status, whether or not they were sick.95 When a pregnant wo-
man underwent cystic fibrosis testing and her fetus was diagnosed as
positive, for example, her health maintenance organization informed
91. As Dawn Johnsen notes, "in order to avoid being 'caught' by the authorities, she
might not seek any prenatal care, thereby endangering both her own and her future child's
health." Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitu-
tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 577, 612 n.56 (1986).
92. Because the stress caused by coerced medical interventions during pregnancy may
harm the fetus, Elizabeth Taylor suggests in her Note that a fetus may have a psychological
and physical interest in his or her mother's autonomy. Elizabeth Taylor, Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations in State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1066 (1981).
93. Fear of discrimination may deter people from undergoing testing. In one study of
women's interest in genetic testing for breast cancer, 15% of women declining breast can-
cer testing indicated that they were refusing testing because of worry about losing insur-
ance. Caryn Lerman et al., Interest in Genetic Testing Among First-Degree Relatives of
Breast Cancer Patients, 57 AM. J. MED. GENEnIcs 385, 389 (1995). Similarly, in a cystic
fibrosis carrier study directed by Dr. Wayne Grody at UCLA, 11% of the subjects exper-
ienced concern over what others would think if the test were positive and 30% said that
they would refuse testing if they knew that the results would be available to insurers.
94. For information on how insurers have responded to information about people's
genetic status, see Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Test-
ing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENPnrIcs 476 (1992); OmcE OF TECINOLOGY ASsESSMENT, CYSTIC
FmRosis AND DNA TEsrs: IMPLICATIONS OF CARRInR SCREENING 31 (1992). See also
NEr A. HOLTZMAN, PROCEED WITH CAUrION 195 (1989); Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrim-
ination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and
Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 119 (1991).
95. E.V. Lapham & J. Weiss, Georgetown University and the Alliance of Support
Groups, Human Genome Education Model Project, 1995 (preliminary results of a survey
of genetic support groups). In one study, 14% of responding genetic counselors reported
that their counselees had difficulty obtaining or retaining health insurance due to genetic
testing results. COMMrrrTE ON AssEssING GENETC Risi~s, supra note 9, at 270.
PRENATAL SCREENINGApril 1996]
her that it would not pay for the health care costs of the child if she
chose not to abort; that decision was reversed after a public outcry.
96
A woman whose mother had breast cancer was told that she could
obtain health care coverage but not for any treatment of breast can-
cer.97 In another instance, a newborn was diagnosed with PKU and
successfully treated. She was covered under her father's health insur-
ance, but when he changed jobs when she was eight years old, she
became ineligible for coverage under his new group plan because of
her diagnosis, even though she was developmentally normal and
healthy.98 Some people who have participated in genetics research,
including a man who had undergone screening for APC (adenomatous
polyposis colon cancer) as part of a study at the Huntsman Cancer
Center at the University of Utah, have lost their health insurance as a
result of their participation. Since health insurance companies can ex-
clude people with pre-existing disorders, genetic testing provides an
enormous loophole whereby numerous diseases can be classified as
pre-existing because they have their roots in our genes.
Insurance in the United States is based on the ideas of risk-
spreading and risk-sharing. When most people's future health risks
are unknown, the future health care costs of a group can be predicted
on an aggregate actuarial basis and the costs spread across the whole
group. As genetic technologies have begun to identify currently-
healthy people who will later develop particular diseases, insurance
companies have begun charging exorbitant amounts-or denying cov-
erage entirely-to people predicted to be at genetic risk. At first
glance, such policies seem reasonable, akin to charging higher rates to
people who smoke. But, as dozens of genes are identified each week,
the absurdity of this approach becomes apparent. Since each of us has
between eight to twelve genetic defects, anyone could become unin-
surable. Alternatively, if each of us were charged an amount equal to
our future medical costs, insurance would entirely lose its risk-spread-
ing benefits.
Just as insurance discrimination might occur based on genetic in-
formation, so might employment discrimination. In the early 1970s,
employers discriminated against African-American employees and
96. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CYsTic FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS:
IMPLICATIONS OF CARRIER SCREENING (1992).
97. National Action Plan on Breast Cancer & NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical,
Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research, Conference on Genetic Dis-
crimination and Health Insurance: A Case Study on Breast Cancer, Testimony of Mary Jo
Ellis Kahn (July 11, 1995).
98. Billings et al., supra note 94, at 478.
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job applicants who were carriers of sickle cell anemia, even though
carrier status had no relation to the individual's health or ability to
perform the job.99 The only significance of the sickle cell trait was
that the carrier would have a 25% chance of having a child with sickle
cell anemia if he or she procreated with another trait carrier.
More recently, a healthy carrier of Gaucher's disease was denied
a government job based on his carrier status.100 Another man was
given restricted benefits and denied a promotion and job transfer be-
cause he and his son carry the gene for neurofibromatosis. 01 Still an-
other man had a job offer withdrawn based on the claim that he "lied"
during a pre-employment physfcal. He had said he was not seriously
ill. However, he had a genetic form of kidney disease, but without any
symptoms. 0
2
According to a 1989 survey of companies by the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, one in twenty companies
conducts genetic screening or monitoring in the workplace. 03 In Sep-
tember 1995, the San Francisco Legal Aid Office filed a class action
lawsuit by employees of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, a laboratory funded by the federal De-
partment of Energy. 0 4 The suit alleged that the lab had tested
African-American employees for the sickle cell gene without their
knowledge or consent and had secretly maintained that information in
their files. In the future, employers may assign workers to tasks, not
on the basis of expressed interests or talents, but on the basis of the
results of genetic testing.
If mandatory fetal cell sorting were in place, insurers and employ-
ers could base their decisions on genetic information in a woman's or
99. ANDREws, supra note 18, at 18.
100. Billings et al., supra note 94, at 478. Gaucher's disease is "an autosomal recessive
disease characterized by a deficiency of lysomal acid-beta-glucosidase." B. Bembi et al.,
Enzyme Replacement Treatment in Type I and Type 3 Gaucher's Disease, 344 LANCET 1679,
1679 (1994).
101. Jon Matthews, Bias Based on Genetic Testing Techniques, SACRAMENTO BEE, May
7, 1995, at A3. Neurofibromatosis is a condition in which there are tumors of various sizes
on particular nerves. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICIONARY 951 (14th ed. 1981). It
has an extremely wide range of clinical manifestations, with some people being only mildy
affected by the disorder.
102. Matthews, supra note 101, at A3.
103. OmCE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESsMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING
IN THE WORKPL'AcE 22 (1990). The survey polled 1500 United States companies, the 50
largest utilities, and the 33 largest unions.
104. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., No. C95-03220 (N.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 12, 1995).
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a resulting child's medical record. 05 A survey of U.S. geneticists re-
vealed that 24% would share the patient's genetic information with
employers without the patient's consent. 0 6 Physicians are increasingly
being placed into the role of "double agents"-with dual loyalties to
the patient and to the patient's school, employer, potential insurer,
relative, or child.10 7
L. The Larger Impact of Genetic Information on Family Members' Own
Risks
The rippling effects of genetic information spread beyond the nu-
clear family. Information about a particular individual reveals genetic
risk information about his or her other relatives as well. A parent and
a child have half their genes in common, as do siblings. Cousins share
one-quarter of their genes, as do grandparents and grandchildren.
When a pregnant woman is forced to learn genetic information about
her fetus, that information indicates certain risks to relatives. For ex-
ample, in a family at risk for Huntington's disease, the fetus' at-risk
grandmother may be in her late forties and not yet know whether she
will get the disease. The fetal diagnosis means that the grandmother,
by necessity, has the genetic mutation and will get the disease. If a
105. In the United States, only a few states have laws banning genetic discrimination in
employment; most of these laws are deficient in that they cover only a limited number of
genetic conditions or in that they apply only to certain types of genetic information (such
as that which is obtained using particular genetic tests). For example, the Louisiana law
only protects sickle cell anemia carriers. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1002(B) (West 1985).
At the federal level, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers with
15 or more employees from refusing to hire or otherwise discriminating against people
with disabilities or who are regarded as having disabilities (unless the disability impedes an
employee's ability to do the job in question). 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1995). In
its compliance manual, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pro-
vided guidance about how the ADA would apply to an individual who is presymptomatic
for a genetic disease. The EEOC wrote that it is illegal for an employer to discriminate
against a person based on genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disor-
ders. As an example, the EEOC indicated that an employer may not refuse to hire an
individual just because the person's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to
colon cancer. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902, at 47 (1995) (defining the term "Disabil-
ity"). This interpretation may not go far enough, however, since it does not specifically
address whether someone can be denied a job because he or she is a carrier of a recessive
disorder such as cystic fibrosis and the potential employer does not want to pay the health
care costs of potential future affected children.
106. John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After
the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 807 (1990).
107. Dorothy Nelkin, The Social Power of Genetic Information, in THE CODE OF
CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 177, 189
(Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
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pregnant woman learns that her fetus has cystic fibrosis, there is a
25% risk that her cousin is a carrier as well.
Even if a pregnant woman decides not to share the genetic infor-
mation with relatives in order to spare them potential psychological,
social, and financial risks, they may learn about it anyway. There is
widespread willingness on the part of geneticists to breach a patient's
confidentiality and disclose information to relatives. In response to a
survey by Dorothy Wertz and John Fletcher, 58% of geneticists said
that they would disclose the risk of Huntington's disease to a relative
without the patient's permission.108 This is despite the fact that Hunt-
ington's disease is untreatable and that less than 15% of individuals at
risk for Huntington's disease decide to undergo testing to determine
whether they have the disease.109
M. Medical Pressure to Undergo Prenatal Testing
Prenatal testing presents serious psychological, social, and finan-
cial risks. Perhaps because such risks are relatively unique to genetics
and infrequently discussed in the medical literature, 110 however, many
physicians view genetic tests as risk-free blood tests and pressure wo-
men to undergo them.' In some instances, physicians surreptitiously
test pregnant women's blood for carrier status. In other instances,
physicians mislead pregnant women into undergoing genetic testing.
In those situations, even so-called voluntary testing may become
mandatory in fact. In an innovative anthropological study, Nancy
Press and Carol Browner observed physician visits in which physicians
offered the maternal serum alphafetoprotein (MSAFP) test to preg-
nant women. A California regulation requires physicians to offer wo-
men the blood test, which measures the level of a fetus'
alphafetoprotein that circulates in a woman's blood.1 2 Press and
108. Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 106, at 770.
109. Bloch, et al., Predictive Testing, supra note 39, at 222.
110. Ellen Wright Clayton notes that "[p]atients' experiences almost never get into
print." Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 Hous. L. REv. 85,
90 (1992).
111. For some women, the fact that a physician has recommended testing will be
enough to make the women undergo it. Abby Lippman observes that "since an expert
usually offers testing and careseekers are habituated to follow through with tests ordered
by physicians, it is hardly surprising that they will perceive a need to be tested." Abby
Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing In-
equities, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 28 (1991) (citations omitted). For some couples, the mere
existence of a prenatal test makes them feel compelled to use it. Adam et al., supra note
90, at 555.
112. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 17, § 6527 (1996).
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Browner identified factors that caused physicians to pressure women
to participate in so-called voluntary MSAFP programs. 113 They found
that the physicians did not obtain true informed consent. Physicians
offering the testing to women did not reveal the significance of the
testing to the women-that it might show that a fetus had spina bifida
or anencephaly and that the women then would be faced with a deci-
sion about whether or not to abort. Instead, the test was routinely
described as "a simple blood test" or as a test to show "how your baby
is developing." While testing was supposed to be voluntary, those wo-
men who refused testing were hounded by the physician until some
consented to testing.
The gender of the physician or genetic counselor can also influ-
ence the amount of pressure put on women to undergo genetic test-
ing.1" 4 Female physicians and counselors tend to be less directive,
more sensitive to personal autonomy issues and more concerned with
the overall effect that testing may have on the family unit as a
whole." 5 The directiveness or nondirectiveness of a physician or ge-
netic counselor may influence not only whether a woman undergoes
prenatal diagnosis but also whether she terminates an affected
pregnancy."
6
There is no data on what proportion of American geneticists and
genetic counselors direct women to abort affected fetuses, although I
have encountered women whose physicians have so pressured
them.1 7 The type of coercion that women may undergo is illustrated
by the case of a woman whose physician discovered prenatally that
113. Nancy Press & Carol Browner, Collective Fictions: Similarities in the Reasons for
Accepting MSAFP Screening Among Women of Diverse Ethnic and Social Class Back-
grounds, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 97, 100 (1993). The authors also note that
health care professionals may push women into prenatal tests due to fear of malpractice
liability. Id.; see also Malinowski, supra note 2, at 1493.
114. Dorothy C. Wertz, Providers' Gender and Moral Reasoning, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS
& THERAPY 81, 82 (1993).
115. Id.
116. If a physician or genetic counselor expresses an opinion as to a course of action, a
woman may view that opinion as a medical recommendation and may be reluctant to
choose an alternative course that the counselor is not "recommending." Gates, supra note
66, at 240.
117. Genetic counselors point out that physicians and counselors will "get directive,
especially if they feel the diagnosis is extremely severe or extremely mild." Malinowski,
supra note 2, at 1468. According to Judy Norsigian of the Boston Women's Health Book
Collective, "when it comes to something like Down's syndrome, most physicians have been
extremely directive and even obnoxious. They will even say, 'we'll be scheduling an abor-
tion for you.' This happens even when the extent of the disability is very mild." Allen,
supra note 76, at 19.
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she would deliver a child with anencephaly. 118 "[T]hey (the doctors)
said her baby would have more in common with a fish than a human.
They said to expect the girl to be as smart as a baboon."1 19 Interna-
tional surveys also suggest that physicians pressure women to abort.
For example, in Portugal, 50% of geneticists advocate termination of a
pregnancy in which the fetus has cystic fibrosis (as compared to 21%
in the United Kingdom).120 This occurs despite the fact that children
with cystic fibrosis are of normal intelligence and, with treatment, can
live until their forties.
There are no standards concerning appropriate prenatal testing.
Some physicians may seek to obtain genetic information that the wo-
man does not want to know about the fetus and does not want to
know about herself. For example, some physicians want to test fetuses
for the breast cancer gene even though there is professional disagree-
ment about whether this is appropriate. The lack of consensus about
what type of screening should be offered means that there is also no
clear guidance for state policymakers adopting mandatory screening
plans. Along those lines, state-initiated screening programs of
newborns vary in the disorders for which they mandate testing. Some
states mandate genetic testing of newborns for certain disorders even
when national panels of medical experts recommend against testing
for those disorders.1
21
N. Impact on Women in General and People with Disabilities
The mandating of genetic testing on pregnant women may have
an overall negative social impact on women and on people with disa-
bilities. The adoption of a law mandating fetal cell sorting would be in
keeping with the long-standing culture of motherhood, which has por-
trayed women as guarantors of their offsprings' wellbeing. Early cases
suggested that women should be forbidden to do certain types of
work-including being lawyers-because such work might make them
less fit to reproduce. And when courts upheld sexist employment laws
118. Anencephaly is a "[c]ongenital absence of brain and spinal cord, the cranium be-
ing open throughout its whole extent and the vertebral canal converted into a groove."
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 78 (14th ed. 1981).
119. Bonnie Gangelhoff, Tragedy Spurs Mother to Back Registry, Hous. PosT, July 11,
1993, at Al, A20, quoted in Malinowski, supra note 2, at 1522.
120. Theresa Marteau et al., Counselling Following Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality: A
Comparison Between German, Portuguese, and U.K. Geneticists, 2 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS
96, 99 (1994).
121. CoMMrrrEE ON AssEssrNo GENETIC RIsKs, supra note 9, at 262-63 (discussing
reasons why newborn screening should not be undertaken for cystic fibrosis).
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that kept women from assuming employment that men were allowed
to take, they used as a rationale women's childbearing role: "that her
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-
having in view not merely her health, but the well-being of the race-
justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion
of man."'1
22
This sentiment expressed by the Court is also in keeping with the
harsh stance taken in a 1927 U.S. Supreme Court case, Buck v. Bell.- 3
In that case, the Court upheld a statute which allowed the involuntary
sterilization of patients of state institutions who suffered from heredi-
tary insanity or mental deficiency. Justice Holmes, otherwise a cham-
pion of individual rights, wrote the Court's opinion, stating:
[w]e have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices ... in order to prevent our being swamped
with incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of wait-
ing to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind.
124
The premium put on healthy babies is also seen in cases in which
courts have been willing to order Cesarean sections for unconsenting
women based on a doctor's advice that the operation is necessary for
the fetus. Psychiatrists have been willing to institutionalize pregnant
women who behave in a manner considered harmful to the fetus. And
legal commentators have proposed statutory systems that would hold
a woman guilty for child abuse if she risked harm to the fetus by
smoking or drinking during her pregnancy or by refusing to follow
doctors' orders. Margery Shaw, for example, recommends that states
adopt policies to prevent the birth of children with genetic diseases.
She suggests that the prevention of genetic disease is so important that
couples who decide to give birth to a child with a serious genetic disor-
der should be criminally liable for child abuse."- 5 Other commenta-
tors advocate reducing the burden of genetic disease to improve the
health of society.126 Some advocate prevention of genetic disease us-
122. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
123. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
124. Id. at 207.
125. Margery Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63,
99 (1984).
126. See, e.g., Thomas Caskey, Molecular Medicine: A Spin-Off From the Helix, 15
JAMA 1986, 1990 (1993).
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ing analogies to infectious disease,127 even where the disorders are un-
treatable, such that "prevention" is directed toward contraception and
abortion. The impropriety of allowing children with genetic disorders
to be born is also implied in articles that point out the financial cost to
society of genetic disorders by providing figures on the annual costs of
care per patient.128
There appears to be a growing interest in subjecting a woman's
pregnancy to public control.129 Arlene Zarembka and Katherine
Franke describe this as the "publicization" of pregnancy. 30 Carol
Beth Barnett observes that "[o]nce a woman becomes pregnant, her
life, her lifestyle and her medical options become subject to public
control and scrutiny... From this perspective, a woman's womb is
like 'quasi-public territory' and a woman's right to bodily integrity and
autonomy receives minimal respect.' 31 Such-an approach conveys
the impression to women and to society that pregnant women are
mere fetal containers.
Mandating fetal cell sorting also further stigmatizes people with
disabilities in our society.132 Existing people who have particular dis-
orders may be viewed as having slipped through the net of prenatal
screening. The argument about the cost savings that could be gained
if women aborted *fetuses with disabilities after mandated testing may
127. Shaw, supra note 125, at 94.
128. See e.g., Benjamin S. Wilfond & Norman Fost, The Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Medical
and Social Implications for Heterozygote Detection, 263 JAMA 2777, 2781 (1990) (average
annual cost $7500; lifetime costs at least $200,000); Peter T. Rowley et al., Cystic Fibrosis
Carrier Screening: Knowledge and Attitudes of Prenatal Care Providers, 9 Am. J. PREY.
MED. 261, 261 (1993) (average annual cost for CF patient $10,000; total direct costs may be
$300,000,000).
129. This is evident, for example, in the prosecution of women who drink alcohol or
use drugs during pregnancy. See, e.g., JANET DrNsMoRE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROSE-
CUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PREGNANT
DRUG USERS: THE DEBATE OVER PROSECUTION (1992).
130. Arlene Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Women in the AIDS Epidemic: A Por-
trait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. Lotus U. LJ. 519, 526 (1990). I have similarly noted a trend
toward "policing pregnancy." See Lori Andrews, A Delicate Condition, STUDENT LAWYER,
May 1985, at 30.
131. Carol Beth Barnett, The Forgotten and the Neglected, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 863, 886-87 (1993) (citation omitted).
132. For perspectives on disability and genetic testing, see Marsha Saxton, Disability
Rights and Selective Abortion, in THm FurTy YEARS WAR: ABORTION POLITICS 1950 TO
2000 (Ricki Solinger ed., forthcoming 1996); Adrienne Asch, The Human Genome Project
and Disability Rights: Thoughts for Researchers and Advocates, 7(3) DIsABIrrY STUD. Q.,
Summer 1993, at 3; Laura Hershey, Choosing Disability, Ms., July/Aug. 1994, at 26-32.
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spill over and might make people with disabilities look like social pari-
ahs based on their existence.133
By compelling fetal cell sorting, the government would influence
the type of children born in our society. This smacks of government-
initiated eugenics. Government control of the traits of children is in-
appropriate, even if some characteristics of the population would ar-
guably be upgraded. 134
II. Using the Data on Impacts to Guide Policy
The empirical data about the negative impacts of genetic testing
on people's emotional well-being and self-concept, personal relation-
ships, and relationships with insurers and employers (as well as its im-
pact on the culture of motherhood and on society's perception of
people with disabilities) argues against requiring people to find out
their genotype against their will. This is especially true in the case of
prenatal testing, where diagnosis of the fetus often reveals genetic in-
formation about the mother or father or both. In addition to the
changes in self-concept a parent may undergo as a result of the revela-
tion of the unwanted genetic information about himself or herself, the
parent and the fetus may also be stigmatized. The genetic information
generated in the course of fetal cell sorting may make the mother,
father, resulting child, or even other relatives uninsurable and unem-
ployable. The possibility of psychological, social and financial risks to
a variety of parties raises a caution against mandatory prenatal screen-
ing, either through a de jure state program or' a de facto medical
practice.
Various blue ribbon panels of government, ethics organizations,
and entities like the Institute of Medicine have already concluded
that, due to the various psychological and social risks of genetic test-
ing, genetics services should be voluntary. With respect to prenatal
testing, the National Institutes of Health Workshop on Reproductive
Genetic Testing: Impact Upon Women has recommended that
"[r]eproductive genetic services should be meticulously voluntary.' 35
Similarly, the Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute
133. This problem would be exacerbated by the fact that few people have contact with
individuals with a disability and consequently may overestimate their cost to society and
underestimate their contribution to society.
134. See discussion infra text accompanying note 153 regarding parents' liberty interest
in childrearing decisions affecting the traits of the children.
135. NIH Workshop Statement, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 6, 7 (Supp. 1, 1993)
(emphasis added).
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of Medicine has recommended that "voluntariness should be the cor-
nerstone of any genetic testing program. The committee [finds] no
justification for a state-sponsored mandatory public health program
involving genetic testing of adults, or for unconsented-to genetic test-
ing of patients in the clinical setting."'1
36
Overriding autonomy by mandating fetal cell sorting clearly has
the most impact on women. Women are the people subject to genetic
testing on their fetuses' behalf, and the action that the state subtly
may be trying to encourage is one that the women would have to
take-abortion. Additionally, diagnosis of the fetus more often pro-
vides information about the mother than about the father. In the case
of a recessive disease, an X-linked disease, and some instances of
dominant diseases, the fetus' genetic status will provide information to
the mother about her genetic status, 137 thus influencing her self-image,
her personal relationships, and her relationships with third-party
institutions.
Moreover, the intrusion on autonomy may be especially egre-
gious to women, who, more than men, feel that doctors should keep
out of reproductive decisions. A Swedish study assessing the attitudes
of women and men towards prenatal diagnosis found that autonomy
in the decision-making process was more important to women than to
men.138 In response to the question: "[W]ho should decide about pre-
natal diagnosis, the couple itself or somebody else?," 82% of women
indicated the couple should make the decision, compared to 20% of
the male partners. 139
The decision of a woman to undergo or refuse testing during
pregnancy cannot be considered in isolation. Jean Sternlight suggests
that a woman making a related decision-whether to have her infant
tested for HIV infection-will consider 1) the accuracy of the pro-
136. CoMmrrrEE ON ASSESSING GENETc RISKS, supra note 9, at 276.
137. Only in a small minority of cases will the fetus' status exclusively provide informa-
tion about the father. This is the case only when the disorder is of the dominant type and
the gene is transmitted by the father. In other instances of dominant disorders, it is the
mother who contributes the gene. In the case of a recessive disorder, both parents pass on
the gene. In the case of X-linked disorders, the mother passes on the gene and 50% of her
sons are affected.
138. Berit Sjogren, Future Use and Development of Prenatal Diagnosis, Consumers'
Attitudes, 12 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1, 2 (1992).
139. No woman indicated that the couple should not be the ultimate decision maker,
while 18% were uncertain. Forty percent of male partners believed that the couple should
not be the decision maker in the use of prenatal diagnosis, and 40% were uncertain as to
who should be the decision maker. The question proposed medical specialists or public
authorities as alternative decision makers to the couple. Id. at 4.
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posed test; 2) the availability of medical care for the child and the
mother, not only in terms of medical technology but also in terms of
budgetary constraints, and the practical feasibility of obtaining the
necessary medical care; and 3) the anti-discrimination and anti-stigma-
tization protection available to both mother and child.140 These are
reasonable considerations. To the extent that the state cannot guaran-
tee appropriate anti-discrimination and anti-stigmatization protec-
tions, a program of mandatory testing should not even be considered.
A. Legal Arguments Supporting Women's Refusal of Testing
The studies on the impact of genetic information can be used in
attempts to persuade legislators and physicians not to mandate fetal
cell sorting on pregnant women. Such studies may help in framing
legal arguments to uphold a pregnant woman's right to refuse fetal
cell sorting. Currently, the constitutional protections supporting a wo-
man's right to refuse medical interventions during pregnancy are four-
fold: privacy protection of certain personal information; protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures; protection of bodily integ-
rity; and protection of reproductive decision-making and decisions re-
garding child-rearing. 141
1. Informational Privacy
Medical information is protected as private, in part because of the
psychological, social and financial risks associated with its disclo-
sure. 142 Common law privacy protections exist for certain types of
medical information, 143 as do federal constitutional protections. 144
140. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Non-Anonymous Testing of Newborns for HIV:
Should It Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 373, 384 (1994).
141. Equal protection concerns might be raised as well. Such testing might be consid-
ered to be discrimination based on pregnancy or perhaps even sex discrimination.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990).
Society's moral judgment about the high-risk activities associated with the dis-
ease, including sexual relations and drug use, makes the information of the most
personal kind. Also, the privacy interest in one's exposure to the AIDS virus is
even greater than one's privacy interest in ordinary medical records because of
the stigma that attaches with the disease.
Id As has been noted in this article, genetic information raises similar risks of stigma and
discrimination.
143. See ANDRaws, supra note 18, at 190-94 (1987) (discussing common law actions for
breach of medical privacy including actions based on the tort of breach of privacy, breach
of contract, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty).
144. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d
264 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Just as "the sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS
makes a compelling argument for keeping this information confiden-
tial,' 45 so too does the sensitive nature of genetic information. Since
mandatory genetic testing would provide medical information about
the woman or fetus to third parties (the laboratory personnel, the wo-
man's physician), this could arguably be a breach of privacy.146 Such
testing would violate one's privacy right not to know medical informa-
tion about oneself1 47 and one's right to refuse medical information
that is part of the right of informed consent in the health care
setting.14
2. Fourth Amendment Protections
A pregnant woman could assert a Fourth Amendment right to
refuse the fetal cell sorting test. 49 Mandatory blood testing is consid-
ered a search and seizure that must comply with Fourth Amendment
standards that balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against
the strength of a given state interest.' 50 Under such an analysis, for
example, mandatory testing of an incarcerated individual for IV in-
fection absent a warrant has been found unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.' 5' Similarly, mandatory HIV testing of state em-
ployees working with developmentally disabled clients was enjoined
as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
145. Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.NJ. 1990).
146. It has long been recognized that blood samples contain more medical information
than does a traditional medical record. As Fred Bergmann of the National Institutes of
Health has pointed out,
[t]he genetic counselor takes a history and puts it in the computer bank. He also
takes a blood sample and puts it in the deep freeze. And from the point of view
of confidentiality, I would suggest that there is much more information in the
deep freeze than in the computer bank, and I think that point should be appreci-
ated by the lawyers and everyone else.
Statement of F. Bergmann, in EThCAL IssuEs iN HuMAN GENEics: GENETIC CouNsEL-
rNG AND T= Usn oF GENETIc KNOWLMGE 411 (B. Hilton et al. eds., 1973).
147. Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the Indi-
vidual Tested. A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 445, 454-57
(1991); Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. R.v. 402, 409-13 (1993).
148. Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J.
LEGAL MED. 163, 215-16 (1984). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1976).
149. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by
the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
150. Id. at 771-72. The blood test in that case was permissible as a minor intrusion. Id.
at 770.
151. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 505 U.S.
1206 (1992).
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since the employees' privacy interests outweighed the state's interest
in preventing the low risk of clients' contracting AIDS from employ-
ees. 152 Such precedents would likewise apply to blood tests to obtain
genetic information.
3. Protection of Bodily Integrity, Reproductive Autonomy and Parenting
Decisions
Women could also argue that they have a right to refuse fetal cell
sorting based on the common law153 (and, in some cases, constitu-
tional)154 protections of an individual's bodily integrity, as well as on
constitutional protections of reproductive autonomy. 55 Recent cases
have begun to recognize a woman's right to refuse invasive interven-
tions, such as Cesarean sections, during pregnancy. 56 In In re A.C.,
the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the decision about whether a
pregnant woman should undergo a Cesarean section should be con-
trolled by the woman's wishes, articulated either through her in-
formed consent or, if she is incompetent, through substituted
judgment. 157 A similar result was reached in an Illinois case, In re
Baby Boy Doe.'58 In that case, a woman refused a Cesarean section
on religious grounds, and the state attorney brought suit to force her
to undergo the operation. The court upheld the woman's right to re-
fuse, recognizing her right to privacy and bodily integrity. The court
held that a woman has no duty to guarantee the physical and mental
health of her child and that a woman may refuse forced interventions
even if the refusal would be harmful to the fetus.' 59
152. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 464 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
153. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Fosmire v.
Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.Y. 1990).
154. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990) ("[A]
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions."); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,426 (Mass. 1977); Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
155. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 121 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
156. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
157. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252. See also Rodney Halstead, A Pregnant Woman's
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment-Is It Always Her Choice?, 24 CErGrroN L. REv.
1589, 1589 (1991).




Parents also have a liberty interest in the type .of children that
they conceive and raise. In U.S. Supreme Court cases involving child-
rearing decisions, the Court has held that the determination of a
child's social traits is a matter for the parents to decide (even if state
control arguably could produce a better child).160 A strong argument
similarly could be made that a child's genetic traits should be deter-
mined by the parents rather than the state. Similar reasoning was
used in dicta in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court said,
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and be-
get a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as
readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to
term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in popula-
tion control, or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has been sensibly
relied upon to counter any such suggestions.
161
B. State Arguments to Uphold Mandatory Fetal Cell Sorting
1. Minimal Burden on Rights
One argument that a state may make in support of mandatory
fetal cell sorting is that the process places only a minimal burden on
the woman and thus should not be viewed as an infringement of her
constitutional rights. Several Fourth Amendment cases view a blood
test as creating minimal risk. 62 Moreover, the cases holding that
pregnant women have a right to refuse Cesarean sections turned, in
part, on the fact that such operations are massively physically invasive.
In In re A.C., for example, the Court stated: "Our discussion of the
160. In the 1920s, states passed laws that forbade parents from sending their children
to private schools and that prohibited schools from teaching a foreign language. The states
argued that they knew better than parents how to create good citizens. In responding to
this argument, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Plato's suggestion that children be raised
communally with no child knowing his parent. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1923). The Court also described the Spartan approach of entrusting the education and
training of boys to official guardians. Id. at 402. The Court commented that, although such
ideas were proposed by "men of great genius," the concepts of "the relation between indi-
vidual and State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it
will hardly be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people
of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution." Id. In a
related case, the Court stated that education for citizenship is part of the parents' role:
"[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose ex-
cludes any general power of the State to standardize its children." Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). In essence, the Court held that the determination of a
child's social traits are a matter for the parents to decide. A strong argument could simi-
larly be made that a child's genetic traits should likewise be determined by the parents.
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 (citations omitted).
162. See, eg., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
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circumstance, if any, in which the patient's wishes may be overridden
presupposes a major bodily invasion. We express no opinion with re-
gard to the circumstances, if any, in which lesser invasions might be
permitted . -.163
The recognition that some interventions are too insignificant to
trigger constitutional scrutiny has been introduced into abortion law
through the undue burden standard. 164 Prior to the recent Casey deci-
sion, a woman may have been able to refuse mandatory genetic test-
ing under the decisions of City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health165 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists. 66 These cases recognized that the provi-
sion of information is not a value-free act. People have a right to
waive information; for example, they can decide to waive the presen-
tation of health care information before they consent to treatment. In
these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the presentation
of information in the context of reproductive decisions can coerce an
individual to make a particular decision. Laws requiring women to be
given information that tended to pressure them not to have abortions
were struck down as unconstitutional. In Akron, the Court struck
down statutory provisions that required physicians to give speculative
information, such as the characteristics of the fetus, including its abil-
ity to feel pain, and provisions that required physicians to present "a
'parade of horribles,' intended to suggest that abortion is a particu-
larly dangerous procedure.' 67 In Thornburgh, the Court held that
the required disclosure of even medically accurate and objective infor-
mation could be unconstitutional because it tended to influence a per-
son's reproductive decision. 68 The Court said: "The States are not
free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to
intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."'1 69 Under the logic of
these cases, giving women information about their fetuses' genetic sta-
tus would have been impermissible as coercing some women toward
abortion.
163. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also In re Baby Boy
Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
164. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
165. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
166. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986).
167. 462 U.S. at 444 n.34, 445.
168. 476 U.S. at 762-63.
169. Id. at 759.
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However, Casey introduced the test of whether a state statute
creates an undue burden on the woman's decision. Casey upheld a
requirement that physicians inform women of the nature of the abor-
tion procedure, the health risks associated with the procedure and
with childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus.170 The
Court held that providing truthful information during pregnancy is
compatible with the state's interest in protecting potential life
throughout pregnancy. 17
1
Nevertheless, one could argue that mandating fetal cell sorting
infringes upon a woman's constitutional rights. Fetal cell sorting en-
tails not just the provision of information (as in Casey), but an inter-
vention-a blood test-to obtain that information. Although some
courts have viewed blood tests as insignificant, genetic blood tests to
determine genetic information may be treated differently. The federal
government, for example, treats them as being different. While other
blood tests used in federally funded research may be exempt from full
Institutional Review Board review, since they are viewed as entailing
"minimal risks,"172 the federal Office of Protection from Research
Risks has indicated that genetic tests present greater than minimal
risks due to psychological risks and social risks including "stigmatiza-
tion, discrimination, labelling, and potential loss of or difficulty in ob-
taining employment or insurance."1 73 In addition, precedents such as
Casey are inappropriate since most genetic disorders capable of being
diagnosed during pregnancy are untreatable, and thus the impact of
learning this information is not likely to result in the protection of
potential life, but the termination of the pregnancy.
2. The State's Interest
With respect to constitutionally-protected fundamental rights,
state restrictions have been upheld if they furthered a compelling state
interest in the least restrictive manner possible. A federal district
court, in Lifchez v. Hartigan, has held that a similar test should be
employed with respect to state restrictions regarding prenatal genetic
testing.1 74 A state seeking to uphold a law mandating fetal cell sorting
might claim that it has a compelling interest in furthering the birth of
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
171. Id
172. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (1991).
173. OFFICE FOR PROTECnION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, NATIONAL INSTIUTEs OF
HEALTH, PROTECrING HUMAN RESEARCH SuBJECS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BoARD
GUIDEBOOK 5-45 (1993).
174. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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healthy children. But mandating prenatal screening does not further
that interest. Since treatment for the screened-for disorders generally
is not available, the effect of testing is to encourage abortion and to
deter carriers from having further children, rather than to promote the
birth of healthy children.175 Because the state cannot show that the
policy improves the health of potential children, the state is likely to
have to fall back on the argument that such a policy advances a state
interest in saving money by discouraging the birth of children with
genetic disorders. However, a state interest in saving money should
not override fundamental rights.' 76 In particular, the burden on the
state in caring for children has not been seen to be a compelling inter-
est in other contexts. For example, in People v. Dominguez,177 a preg-
nant, unmarried woman with two children was convicted of second-
degree robbery. As a condition of her probation, the trial judge re-
quired that she not become pregnant without being married, so that
state taxpayers would be spared the burden of caring for illegitimate
children. The appellate court reversed, finding that while "[t]he bur-
den upon the taxpayers to maintain illegitimate children at the public
expense is a grave problem.., a court cannot use its awesome power
in imposing conditions of probation to vindicate the public interest in
reducing the welfare rolls by applying unreasonable conditions of pro-
bation."'1 78 Moreover, it is unclear that the state could prove, in a
cost-benefit analysis, that screening would actually save a sufficient
amount of money to justify the infringement of individual choice.
While aborting a fetus with cystic fibrosis, for example, may save soci-
ety the costs of rearing that child, the overall costs of screening and
providing necessary counseling and other services for all pregnant wo-
175. The outcome of the constitutional analysis would change very little even if treat-
ment were available. If the disorder at issue could be treated after birth, then testing the
newborn infant would be a less restrictive alternative with respect to the woman than pre-
natal testing. If the disorder needed to be treated while the fetus was in utero, the case for
prenatal testing would be stronger but would still fail, since the treatment would likely be
more intrusive than the blood test and would invade the woman's bodily integrity and
interfere with her right to privacy. Since the woman would be able to refuse the treatment
under In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326,334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), the state could not show that the testing would accom-
plish the end of assuring that the fetus was treated.
176. In U.S. Supreme Court cases, the goal of protecting the public treasury has not
been found to be superior to that of protecting individual rights. A person's right to travel
is recognized as more important than the drain on the welfare system of the state to which
he moves. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 165 (1941).
177. 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
178. Id. at 294.
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men might exceed the cost of rearing the few affected children whose
birth the state seeks to prevent.179
C. Protections Against De Facto Mandatory Testing
Even if the government does not adopt a law mandating fetal cell
sorting, some physicians may undertake such testing on the woman
without her -voluntary, advance, informed consent. Despite the clear
common law precedents giving competent adults the right to refuse
medical intervention and protecting the privacy of medical informa-
tion, some physicians currently undertake genetic tests on pregnant
women's blood without their consent. At a recent meeting at an elite
medical school, I asked the physicians why they engage in such a prac-
tice. In that instance, they indicated that they did not ask pregnant
African-American women for their consent for sickle cell carrier
screening using the women's blood because 1) the women "wouldn't
understand;" 2) the testing was done for the women's benefit; and 3)
other types of testing are performed without consent during preg-
nancy. Each of these reasons is open to challenge.
The rationale that the women would not understand ignores the
fact that some people do have a high level of understanding about
genetic testing or genetic disease because they have relatives affected
with a genetic disorder or because they are members of an ethnic sub-
population in which genetic testing or genetic disease is common. For
example, sickle cell anemia testing has been widely publicized and dis-
cussed within the African-American community; it would be unusual
for an AfricanAmerican woman not to know someone who has been
tested.
Although there is some evidence that members of the general
public who have not had prior experience with genetic disease do not
understand the significance of genetic tests, education through a
brochure, video, health provider, or some combination can ensure
that more individuals have an adequate understanding of the nature
of a particular genetic disease, its pattern of inheritance and the mean-
ing of test results.'80 The existing legal doctrine of informed consent
would seem to require such an effort. There are also sound policy
179. With respect to cystic fibrosis, "[i]t has been estimated that if a national [carrier]
screening program were introduced, it would cost $2.2 million for each case of cystic fibro-
sis avoided." Benjamin R. Sachs & Bruce Korf, The Human Genome Project: Implications
for the Practicing Obstetrician, 81 Onsranucs & GYNECOLOGy 458, 459 (1993).
180. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Teaching About Cystic Fibrosis Carrier Screening by
Using Written and Video Information, 57 AM. J. HuM. GENETIcs 171, 177 (1995).
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reasons to encourage the medical community to make efforts to en-
sure that patients are informed and do understand genetic testing.
The massive efforts to map and sequence the human genome (fi-
nanced with over $3 billion of taxpayer money) will lead to an increas-
ing array of genetic diagnostic tests. People will need to understand
genetic information in order to decide whether to undergo such tests
in order to make decisions about health care, reproduction, and
lifestyle. 181
Secondly, the fact that prenatal testing is ostensibly done for a
woman's benefit does not obviate the need for informed consent. The
case law is clear that people have a right to refuse medical interven-
tion, even if such intervention will benefit them.182 Moreover, it is
unclear exactly what the purported "benefit" to the woman is. If the
woman is a carrier of sickle cell anemia, she is healthy herself. She
has a one-in-four chance of having a child with sickle cell anemia if
she reproduces with another carrier, and so it may be beneficial to let
her know about the risk in case she would like to have her partner
tested or have prenatal testing on the child and abort an affected fe-
tus. But that is far from universally considered a benefit. In some
instances, the woman may already know her partner's test results. If
he is negative for the gene for sickle cell anemia or other hemoglobi-
nopathies, there will be no chance that the fetus will be affected. And
even if both partners are carriers, the one-in-four chance materializes,
and the fetus is affected, the couple most likely will not want to abort.
In a study where women's blood was analyzed for sickle cell carrier
status without their consent, none of the couples aborted when they
later underwent amniocentesis and learned that their fetus was af-
fected.183 So it is hard to see a definite "benefit."
Related to the argument that this involuntary testing benefits wo-
men is the argument that testing is routinely done on pregnant women
without their consent. Putting aside the question of whether any in-
tervention should be done in the pregnancy context without the wo-
man's consent, there are reasons why traditional testing (such as that
for gestational diabetes or placenta previa) is distinguishable from ge-
181. Certain genetic diseases will only manifest if a person with a particular gene
comes into contact with certain environmental stimuli. In the future, some individuals may
choose their foods, jobs, and the climate in which they live based on their genetic types.
182. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also In re Baby
Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that "the right to refuse treat-
ment does not depend upon whether the treatment is perceived as risky or beneficial to the
individual" and citing In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1989)).
183. Rowley et al., supra note 15, at 157.
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netic testing. Standard, nongenetic tests are often performed in order
to plan treatment of the fetus. Genetic testing often reveals that the
fetus is untreatable, so the "benefit" is the possibility of abortion.
There is a much wider range of moral and personal opinion about the
advisability of abortion than about treatment of fetuses or newborns.
A woman understandably may not want information about her ge-
netic status or the fetus' genetic status, because she does not intend to
abort or she does not want to risk genetic discrimination against her
or her future child.184 Standard tests generally are also performed to
identify transitional, pregnancy-related conditions, whereas genetic in-
formation revealed about a woman or her fetus is permanent and im-
mutable in character. If a woman learns through unasked-for prenatal
testing that she has a genetic defect, that information is now in her
record. Her health insurance rates may go up, or the information may
make her uninsurable or unemployable. 185
Just as the state should not mandate fetal cell sorting, neither
should physicians mandate or coerce such testing. The profound im-
pact of genetic information necessitates new policies to ensure that
those women who undergo prenatal testing do so in a voluntary and
informed way. Such testing should never be performed without the
pregnant woman's advance, informed consent. Before testing, she
should be informed of the disorders for which her fetus is being tested,
whether they are treatable, whether she will be faced with a decision
about whether to abort the fetus, and whether the test will reveal in-
formation about her partner as well. In addition, she should be in-
formed of the potential psychological, social, and financial risks that
can result from the identification of genetic information, and their im-
plications for her, her partner, the resulting child, and other family
members.
184. There are financial consequences as well. The women who are tested for sickle
cell anemia without their knowledge are paying for a test that they may not want. One
research study on the topic found that when women who were tested without their knowl-
edge discovered that they were carriers and then learned, through further testing, that they
were carrying a fetus with sickle cell anemia, not a single woman aborted her fetus.
Rowley et al., supra note 15, at 157. Since no woman changed her reproductive behavior
based on the test, each woman at least should have been asked whether she would find it
useful before she was tested and charged for the service.
185. Such a concern was raised by a pregnant woman at a Cystic Fibrosis Association
annual meeting I attended. She had participated in a free research protocol in which she
was not informed in advance of the possibility that the study might identify her as having
two mutant cystic fibrosis genes. When she was so diagnosed, she was concerned that she
would lose her insurance.
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Conclusion
Genetic tests are rapidly entering into medical practice, becoming
part of the medical standard of care virtually overnight. The potential
psychological, social, and financial risks of testing are rarely consid-
ered. When these risks are analyzed in detail, a strong argument can
be made that even genetic tests such as fetal cell sorting, which entail
minimal physical risks, should be performed only with the woman's
voluntary informed consent.
